By Fu Shanxi, Vision Times
Within the inner corridors of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) top echelons, the high-profile political rupture between Zhang Youxia, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and President Xi Jinping represents not only a military purge but the definitive end of the CCP’s “old-guard elder politics” model, which traces all the way back to Deng Xiaoping’s iron-fisted rule.
Once a cornerstone of factional balance within China’s elites, that model has now proven “utterly ineffective” under Xi’s rule, analysts note.
From ‘elder politics’ to authoritarian control
In 1987, Deng Xiaoping deposed Hu Yaobang by mobilizing CCP elders such as Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, and Wang Zhen, who wielded significant party and military prestige. According to internal CCP meeting records, Xi has dismantled this mechanism entirely while handling Zhang Youxia’s case. Under Xi, the CCP has become what political experts describe as a “digital authoritarian mafia,” a system where digital surveillance and political repression replace the informal power of veteran cadres.
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Xi greatly expanded the functions of the Central Special Service Bureau and restructured internal monitoring to ensure that old leaders are watched at all times. Their staff, drivers, even personal doctors are required to report to an office controlled by Cai Qi, standing in stark contrast to the relative autonomy enjoyed by elders in the Deng era.
In the past, elders could discreetly coordinate decisions and manage leadership challenges behind closed doors. Xi’s fear of factional compromise has led him to eliminate the basis for such coordination. Now elders are not quietly influential — they are surveilled and politically neutered.
Xi redefines loyalty
Under Xi, political loyalty has become the sole criterion for advancement. Officials with ties to the “old guard balance” have been systematically removed from mid-level posts. By comparison, today’s leadership consists almost entirely of Xi loyalists or “defectors” whose only qualification is allegiance to him.
Zhang Youxia, long perceived as the last bastion of traditional military influence — a veteran general with deep ties to the PLA’s old guard — was nonetheless brought down in a way that used even darker means than Deng employed against Hu Yaobang. Xi’s removal of Zhang, according to critics, demonstrated that traditional elites no longer have the capacity to restrain Xi’s consolidation of power.
The collapse of elder politics has pushed China’s political system into a precarious phase the author calls “the unbuffered era of personal dictatorship.” Unlike the Deng era, when transitions could occur with minimal systemic damage, under Xi the removal of any key leader destabilizes the very structure of the regime.
In 1987, after Hu Yaobang’s ouster, figures like Zhao Ziyang could temporarily stabilize the party. Today there are no comparable successors. Xi has systematically eradicated potential heirs, meaning that if he were to step down or fall out of power, the entire political system could quickly unravel. Though many within the CCP elite reportedly resent Xi, they are also believed to fear that the collapse of his rule would trigger the collapse of the CCP itself, a fate they are unwilling to risk.
What comes after the CCP?
In the event of regime change, there could be a vacuum of authority at the provincial and local levels. Yet unlike the monolithic CCP structure, Chinese society contains diverse and resilient communities, including commercial associations, religious groups, and traditional family networks, that may quickly form new forms of social cooperation and governance.
Some observers cited express cautious optimism, noting that elements of civic organization and democratic aspiration existed historically in China, such as during the late Qing and early Republican periods. If the CCP’s hold were broken, these latent forces might help shape a new social and political order. However, achieving “transformational justice,” publicly exposing the CCP’s accumulated crimes and preventing the rise of another authoritarian power, would be key to avoiding a repeat of past cycles of dictatorship.
Ultimately, the fall of Zhang Youxia is a watershed moment in Xi’s consolidation of power and a clear sign that the era of elder-driven governance is over. What remains is a tightly controlled, surveillance-driven political order centered entirely on Xi’s personal authority — an order that may be powerful, but structurally brittle, analysts note.
Editorial note: This article is based on publicly circulating reports and commentary from independent analysts. The claims described have not been independently verified by Vision Times, and relevant authorities have not publicly confirmed the allegations.
